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Process and Procedure in WTO
Dispute Settlementt
John H. Jackson tt
Well, thank you very much, Professor Barcel6. It is indeed a pleasure
and a privilege to come here, not only to see Cornell and the premises, as
splendid as they are, but also to see all these very high-powered experts
here in the room that are, I am sure, just waiting to cut me to pieces on
anything I have to say. But, it is really great to have exchanges of this type.
I want to also say I am just very pleased that we are honoring Professor and
Doctor Yasuhei Taniguchi.' He and I have been friends for, I think, forty
years (he counted one time for me). It is always a pleasure to listen to him,
and he touched on some things this morning that I have been struggling
with also.2 I felt he "pressed the right buttons," so I am hopefully going to
build a little bit on what he has said. Among other things, I think that
what he is saying is that there are some important weaknesses in the World
t This Comment is based on a presentation that the author delivered at Cornell
University Law School during the Berger/Cornell International Law Journal Symposium.
tt John H. Jackson is University Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law
Center and Director of the Institute of International Economic Law at GULC. He came
to Georgetown after a distinguished career as Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan. Previously, he served as General Counsel for the Office of the
President's Special Representative for Trade in the U.S. Executive Office of the President
in Washington, D.C. (1973-1974), and Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs at
the University of Michigan. Professor Jackson is the Editor in Chief of the Journal of
International Economic Law, published by Oxford Press (UK) since 1998. In 2003, he
was awarded the honorary degree, "Doctor luris Honoris Causa," from Hamburg
University Faculty of Law. Professor Jackson's most recent important honors include
the Manley 0. Hudson medal, awarded him in April 2008 by the American Society of
International Law, and an honorary doctorate award in October 2008 by the European
Union Institute (in Florence, Italy). The Manley 0. Hudson award is the highest honor
of the ASIL, and is awarded no more than once a year, to honor the lifetime work of the
international law scholarship of the recipient. The EUI award of honorary doctorate is
also intended to honor the excellence of lifetime work of legal scholarship related to
international economic relations and activity. A full biography of Professor Jackson can
be found on the Georgetown Law Center website, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
faculty/facinfo/tab-faculty.cfm?Status=faculty&D=267.
1. For background information on Professor Taniguchi, see Keynote Speaker:
Yasuhei Taniguchi, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/newsevents/Berger-ILJ-Sympo-
sium/Keynote-Speaker.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009); Yasuhei Taniguchi-Lawyer Pro-
file, http://www.martindale.com/Yasuhei-Taniguchi/ 1233487-lawyer.htm (last visited
Sept. 27, 2009).
2. See Yasuhei Taniguchi, The WTO Dispute Settlement as Seen by a Proceduralist, 42
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (2009) (discussing the structure and function of the WTO dispute
settlement system).
42 CORNELL INT'C L.J. 233 (2009)
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Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement (DS) system.3 On this, I
fully agree.
The WTO DS system is probably the single most powerful juridical-
type institution at the international law level, assuming you do not count
something like the European Community-which I think now is no longer
international, but more like a national system-or the Roman Empire. I
think the WTO DS system is enormously powerful, and it has some very
important interrelationships with the international system. Those interre-
lationships are something that a lot of us, including Georges Abi-Saab, 4
have had to struggle with, because there is a certain interplay that goes on.
First of all, I want to deal with the overall picture of international law.
Secondly, I want to take up one particular issue, namely the question of the
use of precedent.
Let me talk first about some general perspectives of international law
which have some effects on the WTO. My comments stem, incidentally,
from my book that was published by Cambridge University Press two years
ago-Sovereignty, The WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International
Law.5 In that book, I took up a series of jurisprudential issues that I encap-
sulated in short, succinct portions. 6 Now some of my work has gone
beyond that, using that book as a jump-off point. Of course, the precedent
issue is one of about a dozen of those issues that can be taken out some-
what more in depth. So, indeed, that means that this is in a sense a work
in progress. The book is finished, but this is a work in progress of the next
phase.
Now I will start with the notion that when you really get under the
skin of international law, the logic of international law is really very defec-
tive. This is provocative, I know, and again, I am somewhat tentative in
saying this, but I am beginning to be more and more certain.
There are a number of different reasons that support my growing cer-
tainty, the crux of which is what is really customary international law.
How should we treat treaties? Should treaties all be treated the same way
or should some treaties be treated differently, such as a so-called "constitu-
tional" treaty? Some treaties have huge memberships, including the
WTO, 7 and they are virtually impossible to amend.8 And so we have treaty
rigidity, which really raises a series of questions of how matters in a juridi-
3. For information on the WTO DS system, see generally ERNST-ULRICH
PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997).
4. See, e.g., Georges Abi-Saab, The WTO Dispute Settlement and General Interna-
tional Law, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 7 (Rufus
Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005).
5. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
6. See generally id.
7. As of July 23, 2008 the WTO has 153 members. See Understanding the WTO:
The Organization-Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO-e/
whatis -e/tif e/org6-e.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
8. See, e.g., Sital Kalantry, The Intent-to-Benefit: Individually Enforceable Rights
Under International Treaties, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 63, 81 (2008).
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cal institution associated with the treaty should proceed, and that might
mean different ways of going about the interpretation.
Now there are several conundrums that I will just mention very rap-
idly, and each one of them is provocative. In particular, I think there are
three worrisome issues or conundrums that have enormous implications
for general international law, but also some risks and dangers. The first
one is the shift in attitudes about sovereignty. What is sovereignty? Sover-
eignty has been described as organized hypocrisy.9
Secondly, there are various ideas about the legitimacy of international
law norms. What does it stem from? What is the basis? Is it truly consent
of sovereigns? If you think that sovereignty is being challenged, then the
consent of sovereigns idea as a base of international law is enormously
weakened, and so we really have to think about that. Now, Oscar
Schachter 10 and Louis Henkin" have both been great inspirations for me
in my work. Oscar Schachter, who is now deceased, had written in one
passage that I have often used that there are thirteen different basic sources
of international law, and he goes through all thirteen-a "baker's dozen," if
you will. 12 Thirdly, there is the question of the role of treaties in municipal
law and domestic law. So you can see that if you have struggled with any
of these issues, and I imagine that almost everyone here has struggled with
them, that there really are many things that we could spend hours on
individually.
Now the WTO in a sense is a case study, a very important case study
of how some of the "devil in the detail" is going to play itself out in these
matters. There is a tremendous amount of experience involved already in
the eleven or so years that the WTO and its dispute settlement system has
existed. Incidentally, for the dispute settlement system, I use the word
"juridical," because we are not supposed to use the word "court" or "tribu-
nal." So I use the word juridical, but the WTO is an extraordinary juridical
process, and there have been many cases brought before the WTO DS
system.
In addition, I will add, we have something like 35,000 pages of juris-
prudence from that effort now. When you compare that to other interna-
tional juridical institutions, that is really quite an extraordinary output. I
would claim, and I have claimed in print, that it is extraordinarily high
9. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 42 (1999).
10. For background information on Professor Schachter, see generally Lori Fisler
Damrosch, Oscar Schachter (1915-2003), 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 35 (2004); Richard N. Gard-
ner, Remembering Oscar Schachter, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663 (2005).
11. For background information on Professor Henkin, see generally Harold Hongju
Koh, The Future of Lou Henkin's Human Rights Movement, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
487 (2007); Jose E. Alvarez, President, Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Address at Columbia Law
School on Louis Henkin's 50th Anniversary in the Academy (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/presremarks060928.pdf.
12. Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, in THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 9, 9-12, 30-31 (Stephen M. Schwebel ed., 1971).
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quality overall. 13 This does not mean that there are not some things that
we might differ on, or that I might not criticize in other contexts. I said this
once in the presence of the then-Appellate Body membership about ten or
fifteen years ago, and then at the lunch that followed, a member asked me,
"Would you tell me which one of those you think are the wrong decisions?"
I replied, "I won't touch that with a ten foot pole." But, anyway, he is still
around; and we will probably tangle some more on those things.
Now, looking at some of the international law theory weaknesses,
there are four problems that really have engaged some of my attention at
least, and I want to mention them to show the scope of the problems that
we have to face. One question is: Is there an obligation on the part of the
nation-state to perform as suggested in a report of the Appellate Body or of
a panel? Now you think that answer would be absolutely certain, but the
answer has been fought over in the literature. 14 I have been an active par-
ticipant in that literature.1 5 I have come to the conclusion that there is an
international law obligation to perform, but that it had to be, and may still
have to be, worked over. 16
Secondly, there is a question of the role of precedent. Thirdly, there is
a question of the effects of precedent and its role in municipal law. Those
two questions are linked, and I will show you how. Fourthly, there is a
question of the degree of deference that the international system in the
WTO generally should take toward the nation-state, and the troubles and
difficulties that it has. Now some of those issues begin to point to the
treaty process and particularly the question of interpretation. The basis of
most discussion on the interpretation of treaties in international law has
been the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 17 (VCLT).1 8 I do think
there is very good reason to question that; we really have to release our-
selves from some of the constraints that some people seem to read into that
Convention.
We have to understand that in the WTO context, the Vienna Conven-
tion is not operating as a treaty, because more than sixty members of the
WTO have not ratified the Convention. 19 That includes such countries as
13. John H. Jackson, The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism, 2000 BROOKINGS TRADE F. 179, 179-80.
14. Compare JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 126-27 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM], with Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgiving Regarding the Application of International
Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159, 166 (1993) (stat-
ing that there is no international obligation to perform).
15. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRU-
DENCE 81-89 (1998) [hereinafter TRADE ORGANIZATION]; WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra
note 14, at 126-27.
16. TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 15, at 94.
17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
18. See, e.g., TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 15, at 94.
19. See Barry Cohen, Comment, The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 28 CATH. U. L.
REv. 797, 813 n.97 (1979).
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Brazil,20 France,2 1 the United States,2 2 and Indonesia. 2 3 And so, the issue
is not the language of the treaty itself, but it is the argument that that lan-
guage embodies customary international law, and that gets you into a
whole series of questions. One question is do we really need to adhere to
the VCLT so compliantly? In fact, it has not always been done. I think the
WTO Appellate Body has been pretty nuanced in that. But what I am sug-
gesting is that we have to adopt the somewhat more liberal idea of potential
interpretive mechanisms. Now, what are some of the interpretative tech-
niques that might be looked at that do not seem to have strong grounding
in the Vienna Convention? One is so-called "purposive," that is, looking at
policy goals and policy directions, sometimes called the teleological
technique.
Second, the way preparatory work is utilized can be disputed. I think
the notion that it is only supplementary is wrong and does not get to some
of the essential needs of treaty interpretation. There is also a question of
"evolutionary" interpretation. The question of deference to the nation-state
I mentioned already; the question of precedent that I also mentioned; and
also underlying all this, the question of whether the process is often one of
balancing, proportionality, and not just a particular rule that has to be
applied. In particular, I have criticized-in print and otherwise-rules such
as in dubio mitius,2 4 which I think can undermine a good interpretation.
Now let me turn to the precedent question. My basic starting proposi-
tion is that the concept of precedent in international tribunal usage needs
some important attention in international law discussions and analysis.
The word precedent needs to be differentiated from the phrase stare decisis
and analyzed for what it is. In my view, precedent is not a binary con-
cept-that is, not a yes or no. It is a multilayered concept, or a ladder of
concepts, which must be carefully used, and, incidentally, I am not the
only one that says this. Professor John Barcel6, in fact, is an author of a
chapter in a book that has been very useful in some of my thinking on
20. Guido F.S. Soares, The Treaty-Making Process Under the 1988 Federal Constitution
of Brazil, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 495, 496 (1991) (stating Brazil has not yet ratified the
Convention).
21. Salvatore Zappall, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction
for International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12
EUR. J. INT'L L. 595, 602 n.40 (2001) (stating France has not ratified the Convention).
22. Durval de Noronha Goyos, Reflections on Certain U.S. Law Specificities that Con-
stitute Obstacles to the Free Trade Area of the Americas: A Brazilian Perspective, 28 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 543, 556 (1997) (stating the United States has not ratified the
Convention).
23. Garrie J. Moloney, Australian-Indonesian Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty:
A New Offshore Petroleum Regime, 8 J. ENERGY NAT. REsOURCEs L. 128, 136 n.67 (1990)
(stating Indonesia has not ratified the Convention).
24. John H. Jackson, The Varied Policies of International Juridical Bodies- Reflections
on Theory and Practice, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 873-74 (2004) (in dubio mititus
expounds the idea "that if there is any doubt about an interpretation at all, the govern-
ment that has signed on to it and is now the actor taking a certain interpretation has not
consented to anything else").
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precedent, and he knows indeed about what I am talking about.2 5
Precedent has some very strong policy underpinnings. I will give you
a hypothetical here; I am not sure how far I can get into this, but let me take
a stab at it. To make matters a little more concrete, let me suggest the
following as to the question "what is international law?" This discussion
has some important relevance to domestic law and the jurisprudential pol-
icy of the United States. Unfortunately we all recognize that just prior to
2009, the current U.S. government has not been exactly friendly towards
international law, so the matter I am raising has some poignancy and
implications of some importance to world order, peace, and good policy.
My hypothetical also illustrates the troubled landscape of how interna-
tional law is applied in domestic nation-state systems: our municipal law.
Suppose a nation such as the United States does not directly apply a
treaty measure, that is, does not give it self-executing status, or what I have
termed in some of my writing, "statute-like" treatment.2 6 Nevertheless,
despite such a dualist approach, a treaty, even when not given direct effect,
most certainly does have some effects upon the domestic law. One such
effect is the rule of consistency, which we sometimes in U.S jurisprudence
call "The Charming Betsy" case. 27 Suppose a national court is interpreting
what international law is and, in light of statutory interpretations, has sev-
eral choices. If only one of those choices is consistent with international
law, then the court is supposed to take that approach. This has been some-
what controversial. 28 Suppose a court in the United States is interpreting a
U.S. statute, and there is a claim that the U.S. statute is in conflict with a
treaty phrase in the WTO. Suppose there is advocacy on both sides of this,
and so the judge rightly says, "Where do I go? Where should I look?"
Key question: should he look at the WTO Appellate Body opinions
and what should he make of them? He goes to the WTO Appellate Body
opinions and suppose, hypothetically again, that the WTO Appellate Body
reports ruled in a certain way on the question. Now suppose at the nation-
state level (e.g., the U.S. court), you have advocates on both sides, and what
do they seem to be arguing in this context? One of the things that they
argue is no, the Appellate Body ruling is not law. Then they usually refer to
the language that parallels Article 59 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, which I quote, "[t]he decision of the court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." 29
25. SeeJohnJ. Barcel6, Precedent in European Community Law, in INTERPRETING PRECE-
DENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 407-36 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds.,
1997).
26. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 310 (1992).
27. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)("[An act of Congress . . . can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect
neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in [the
United States].").
28. See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir.
2001).
29. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59,June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S. 993.
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Now that is devastating, you would think, to the idea of precedent. It
really undercuts the notion-it certainly means there is no stare decisis,
but that is not what we are talking about. Remember, I am talking about a
laddered layer of different concepts and precedent from the top-stare deci-
sis-to something less weighty with burdens of proof, and then all the way
down to the case where we do not pay any attention to it except for its
titillating effect. So, you have this possibility at that point. But in practice,
various tribunals of the world, including nation-state tribunals that argua-
bly do not use a common law stare decisis method, do follow precedent.
The European Community Court of Justice in Luxembourg is a very good
example.
It is more of a continental court system than it is common law.30 It
has used reference to prior cases in its operations. 3 1 Now it does accom-
modate somewhat better than stare decisis would, the opportunity to ask
for a change, to reason there should be a change. The ICJ to some extent
does this, and scholars have noted that even in continental countries,
which some would argue are not following precedent or would not have to
follow precedent,32 we do see precedent operating. In the book that I men-
tioned is one example, and there are many others. I also have colleagues in
Europe who elaborate on that,3 3 so European countries are constantly
using precedent. Now, in the WTO, we see precedent being used, no mat-
ter how you call it.
Furthermore, there might be special reasons in the WTO for this activ-
ity to continue. I do not like to push this idea that the WTO is a separate
juridical system, but here is an area where it might be said to be. In the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, 34 there is a stress that the most central
element in the dispute settlement process is "security and predictability. 3
5
Now for things to be secure-stable, in other words-and predictable, you
really have to have some precedential effect, and when you look at what is
happening in the cases, you see that. For instance, in US- Steel Safeguards,
the WTO panel came out with a 1000 page report that had 5800 footnotes,
almost all of which were to prior cases in the WTO jurisprudence.3 6 So
30. See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SELECTED INSTRUMENTS
RELATING TO THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE COURT (1975)
(1963).
31. See, e.g., Case C-127/08, Metock v. Minister for Justice, Equal. & Law Reform, 3
C.M.L.R. 39 (2008).
32. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 173-77; see also KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 259-65 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
33. Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT'L LJ.
333, 349-54 (1999); Louis F. Del Duca, Developing Global Transnational Harmonization
Procedures for the Twenty-First Century: The Accelerating Pace of Common and Civil Law
Convergence, 42 TEX. INT'L LJ. 625, 641-48 (2007).
34. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
35. Id. art. 3.2.
36. Panel Report, United States- Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, WT/DS248/R, WT/DS249/R, WT/DS251/R, WT/DS252/R, WT/
DS253/R, WT/DS254/R, WT/DS258/R, WT/DS259/R (July 11, 2003).
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there we have precedent in practice-at least some sort of precedent.
That is most of my argument, but not all of my argument. We really
do need to be thinking constructively about what precedent means gener-
ally in international law, but particularly in the WTO context. I think it
does not mean that a domestic U.S. court, for instance, should ignore what
the WTO Appellate Body has said. I think not only should a domestic U.S.
court not ignore it, but rather the U.S. court should give what the Appellate
Body said great weight. And there has to be a reasoned argument given if
some departure from that is going to happen. That reason should not be
just about someone having a different view, but that there really is some
reason why we should not part from the precedent area.
Now where does all this take us? I have to admit that my criticism is
dangerous in the minds of some people, because if we release ourselves
from the disciplines of the Vienna Convention, or certain other concepts
that have been deemed to be embedded in international law, doesn't that
raise the danger, the "horror" that people express of judicial activism? The
answer is yes, it does that, but we have to be more sophisticated.
Just like using the word "sovereignty" as a mantra to scare people off
something that is mainly proposed to coordinate internationally, judicial
activism is also a dangerous mantra. So, what could you say if, however,
you are trying to justify that approach as to what is international law? I
will use a phrase from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes from more than a
century ago. He said we have to recognize the possibility for a concept of a
ruling of the past to be considered. 37 But, he says basically that a predic-
tion of what the courts will do "is nothing more or less" what it deems to
be the law. 38 So maybe a prediction of what the Appellate Body would do
in the light of what they have done in their practice for eleven or twelve
years and these one hundred plus cases is indeed law, if we view law in that
broader context.
37. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457 (1897).
38. Francis D. Wormuth, The Dilemma of Jurisprudence, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 44, 46
(1941).
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